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ABSTRACT 
PAYING FOR YOUR CRIME: THE PAY-TO-STAY JAIL PROGRAM IN 
CALIFORNIA 
 
by Carla S. Schultz 
Many California cities have recently implemented pay-to-stay jail programs at the 
local level. Pay-to-stay programs provide a safe and private incarceration experience for 
those who can afford the nightly fee. This study provides a theoretical analysis of the 
pay-to-stay jail program in relation to mass incarceration and the ever-expanding prison 
economy. It examines pay-to-stay programs as a new method of stratified punishment, 
reproducing race and class oppression within the U.S. penal regime. A case study of the 
Fremont pay-to-stay program offers insight into the implementation, operation, and 
application process for inmates seeking segregation from general county jail populations. 
This study concludes that pay-to-stay creates a two-tiered jail system—separating the 
deserving from the undeserving—and promotes disproportionate treatment within the 
criminal justice system. 
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Introduction 
“Pay-to-stay” jail programs, a growing phenomenon within the correctional 
system, charge inmates a nightly fee for a stay in a safe jail. Offered throughout 
California, pay-to-stay jails provide an alternative and exclusive incarceration experience, 
allowing eligible inmates to escape violent, overcrowded, and unsafe detention conditions 
in county jail facilities. In 2012, the Fremont Police Department opened California Bay 
Area’s first pay-to-stay jail program. In Fremont’s pay-to-stay jail, visitors pay $155 per 
night to stay in a “clean and efficiently operated” (Fremont Police Department, “Pay to 
Stay”) facility with access to community areas, showers, phones, and a private cell. The 
city police departments of Fremont, Beverly Hills, Huntington Beach, Arcadia, Fullerton, 
and Redondo Beach, to name a few, are currently interviewing and accepting inmates 
into their exclusive pay to stay jail programs. Inmates who meet the eligibility 
requirements set forth by the city’s police department are financially responsible for their 
own incarceration, paying anywhere from $100 (e.g., City of Arcadia, City of Fullerton 
Police) to $198 per night (e.g., City of Redondo Beach). The emergence of pay-to-stay 
programs in California and other states ignites many questions and concerns about 
equality in the ever-expanding United States carceral system. 
Over the last 40 years, the United States’ penal landscape and correctional 
economy has shifted drastically. Beginning in the 1970s, draconian policies, aggressive 
police tactics, and discriminatory “wars” fueled a massive incarceration binge. “Today,” 
writes Simon (2014), “the number of people imprisoned in America remains at or near 
historic highs (nearly four times the average incarceration rate for the first three quarters 
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of the twentieth century)” (p.1). Approximately 2.4 million people are confined in the 
United States at any given moment, with nearly 12 million people cycling through local 
jails per year (Wagner & Sakala, 2014). Chronic overcrowding and lack of adequate 
inmate healthcare have produced an incarceration system not based on rehabilitation, but 
incapacitation and human warehousing (Simon, 2014). California’s pay-to-stay programs 
offer an escape from the violent, overcrowded, and unsafe conditions of county jails—
with a price.  
Chapter I explores the road to mass incarceration in the United States—detailing 
the punitive shift and the emerging prison crisis. Mass incarceration is described as the 
most recent system of oppression stemming from a history of racist and despotic 
institutions in the United States. It is examined through the lenses of critical 
criminologists Wacquant (2001), Davis (2003), and Alexander (2010), to name a few. 
Chapter I also describes how minorities, the poor, and low-level offenders have been 
disproportionately affected by the policies of mass incarceration. A thorough 
understanding of mass incarceration allows for a deeper, more meaningful discussion 
about what it means to introduce pay-to-stay programs in today’s justice system. Chapter 
II develops a history of the United States prison economy. Pay-to-stay programs are 
evaluated as a successor in a long line of inmate exploitation—from slavery, to convict 
leasing, and private prisons. Charging inmates for the costs of incarceration is a 
neoliberal response to the economic recession and prison overcrowding crisis. Chapter II 
also identifies other ways in which the financial burden has been shifted away from the 
state and on to the inmate. In Chapter III, a detailed history of the pay-to-stay program is 
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provided along with a case study of the Fremont pay-to-stay jail program. The case study 
analyzes the Fremont pay-to-stay program’s implementation, operation, and application 
process. The study concludes with an analysis and future recommendations in Chapter 
IV.  
This study attempts to answer the following research questions: (1) Why are pay-
to-stay programs being implemented? (2) What are the relationships between pay-to-stay 
programs and the changing prison economy? (3) How has pay-to-stay gained public 
acceptance? (4) Historically, how have inmates paid for their incarceration? (5) Who is 
eligible for pay-to-stay? (6) How is pay-to-stay implemented? The overall goal of this 
study is to evaluate California’s pay-to-stay jail program and its implications for the 
justice system and society as a whole. 
Chapter I. Mass Incarceration & Theoretical Framework 
 Pay-to-stay programs are only one part of the broad and wide-ranging punishment 
apparatus in the United States. Therefore, a solid understanding of the evolution of mass 
incarceration helps one situate pay-to-stay programs within the U.S. penal system. This 
chapter provides a history of mass incarceration and a road map for how the criminal 
justice system has developed—resulting in today’s prison crisis.  
For the past four decades, the U.S. has been systematically incarcerating its 
citizens at an alarming rate (see Figure 1).  
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Figure 1. The U.S. state and federal prison population from 1925-2012.  
Source: The Sentencing Project (2015) 
 
Currently, 1 in 31 adults is under the control of the U.S. correctional system (Clear & 
Frost, 2014, p. 63), which has rapidly become the largest in the world. In the second half 
of the 20th century, the United States witnessed great strides toward the affirmation of 
civil and human rights, but these progressive developments have been paralleled—in 
ways that some of the literature has considered non-coincidental (see Flamm 2007; see 
also Murakawa, 2014) — by an unprecedented expansion of the carceral system, with 
regards to both prison building and the subsequent stockpiling of human bodies. Scholars 
in the field of punishment and society have referred to this unprecedented expansion of 
the penal system as ‘mass incarceration’ (Wacquant, 2001; Davis, 2003; Simon, 2014). 
First described by Garland in 2001, mass incarceration refers to “an abnormally high rate 
of imprisonment which is concentrated, and thus affects, a particular demographic 
population” (Martensen, 2012, p. 211). Mass incarceration describes a penal era, 
beginning in the 1970s, characterized by increasingly punitive penal policies, a massive 
process of prison expansion, and growing levels of social stratification (Wacquant, 2009). 
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This following chapter explores the path to mass incarceration in the United States, 
providing a broad overview of how it was implemented and against whom. This 
reconstruction is grounded in a theoretical framework based on conflict theory, critical 
criminology, and critical race theory.  
Theoretical Framework: A Critical Lens 
Critical criminologists argue that systems of incarceration are inherently 
oppressive. In his recent works, Wacquant (2001) famously identifies “four peculiar 
institutions” that have contributed to racialized hierarchies of social inequality over the 
past two centuries in the United States. These institutions include slavery, Jim Crow, the 
urban ghetto, and the hyperghetto/prison. The most recent among these “race-making” 
institutions—what Wacquant (2001) defines as a “deadly symbiosis” between the post-
industrial ghetto and the contemporary warehousing prison—acts as a pipeline between 
strictly policed urban neighborhoods and a hypertrophic criminal justice system. This 
pipeline has fueled mass incarceration. Wacquant (2001) claims that previous systems of 
oppression failed when they no longer met the needs of the economy nor the prevailing 
cultural and legal sensibilities of the time, and were therefore replaced with new systems, 
better aligned with the requirements of contemporary socioeconomic paradigms. 
Along similar lines, in her bestseller The New Jim Crow (2010), Michelle 
Alexander traces a history of institutional racial oppression from slavery, to post-
Reconstruction Black Codes, and Jim Crow laws. Alexander (2010) identifies mass 
incarceration as the current mode of institutional racial subjugation stemming from the 
aforementioned line of predecessors. According to Alexander, systems of racial 
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oppression have evolved over time to adhere to evolving legislation, constitutional 
standards, and dominant societal norms (Alexander, 2010).  She argues that mass 
incarceration reproduces a caste system based on racial hierarchy, white supremacy, and 
the marginalization of poor African Americans. Blanketed in race-neutral and class-
neutral language, mass incarceration exists through a false cloak of “colorblindness” (see 
also Bonilla-Silva 2013; Omi & Winant, 2014). The penal system is a racialized 
institution of violence and oppression, continuing to thrive under the banner of ‘justice 
for all.’ 
Although the succession of racially oppressive institutions has been brought to the 
forefront of critical criminology, the reproduction of structures of class oppression in a 
late-capitalist society like the United States is not as prominently discussed in the 
literature. In this work, I argue that it is equally imperative to acknowledge that this 
historical lineage of oppressive institutions is designed to discipline individuals based on 
race and class. Therefore, this study draws from the epistemological framework of 
critical criminology—and more specifically, from the structural perspective known as the 
“political economy of punishment” (see De Giorgi 2012)—to analyze the foundation and 
consequences of pay-to-stay jail programs. 
According to Hallett (2006), “critical criminology is rooted in the ‘conflict’ 
perspective of sociology, which views social relations in terms of groups vying for social 
power. Instead of working together in a consensual fashion for the common good, groups 
with unequal power and competing interests constantly battle for control over access to 
resources, prestige, and political entrée” (p. 22). Classical social theorists such as Karl 
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Marx, Friedrich Engels, and Georg Simmel were the pioneers of conflict theory in the 
mid-1800s. They insisted that social disorder was the product of a capitalist economy, 
and was caused by the economic exploitation of one social class by another. Later on, 
Marxist criminologist Willem Bonger applied conflict theory specifically to 
criminological theory to develop what he defined as a “socialist theory of crime.” Bonger 
claimed that crime resulted from the criminogenic contradictions of capitalism. 
Capitalism created a divide between the rulers and the ruled, and pitted people against 
one another in economic struggle. He, too, saw crime as a product of unequal distribution 
of wealth and power produced by the acquisitive logic of the capitalist economy. 
Conflict theory argues that group interests regarding lawmaking and penal 
function are not equally represented. Rather, more powerful groups have the authority to 
define crime and determine both how to enforce the law, and against what populations. 
The conflict perspective posits that “inequalities in social power are ultimately a real 
source of what gets defined as ‘crime’” (Hallett, 2006, p. 23), thus creating an unequal 
penal system based on the values of the dominant social group.  
Critical criminology is influenced by conflict theory, as it too recognizes 
discrepancies in the law as experienced by different social groups. Early critical 
criminologists examined these discrepancies in group power and in the application of the 
law from an economic perspective. Marxist theories focused on class struggle, economic 
barriers, and power imbalances between groups of different socio-economic statuses. A 
rich vs. poor dynamic was used to explain differences in crime and punishment, 
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essentially theorizing that laws were written and enforced by the upper class against the 
lower classes.  
In the past few decades, critical criminology has expanded its focus to incorporate 
analyses of other group inequalities, such as race and gender. As Hallett (2006) explains, 
“critical criminology has thus evolved from its early focus on economics as the primary 
source of group inequality to now include examination of the class, racial, patriarchal, 
and colonialistic social relations that enabled the economic exploitation described by 
earlier critical criminologists” (p. 24). Under this perspective, the economic exploitation 
of certain groups is rooted in the preexisting oppressive institutions of racism and gender 
inequality; thus, the institutions of race, class, and gender are intertwined.  
Critical race theory further enriches the theoretical toolkit of critical criminology, 
as it associates identity markers (such as race, class, and gender status) with oppression, 
social injustice, and political power. Thus, critical race theorists argue that specific 
identity markers such as “whiteness,” “masculinity,” “darkness,” and “femininity” are 
historically associated with varying degrees of access to wealth and power—including 
the power to punish. In the realm of punishment, “darkness” has become increasingly 
associated with poverty, crime, and incarceration. Rather than seeing social status as a 
byproduct of historically oppressive institutions, critical race theorists understand social 
identity markers as the actual “mechanisms of oppression” (Hallett, 2006, p. 28). 
Socioeconomic markers related to race and class also correlate with the severity 
of punishment, and, more specifically, with chances (and duration) of imprisonment. 
Crimes of the upper class—such as “white collar crimes”—are typically not handled by 
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the justice system with the same strictness as crimes of the lower class. Social status and 
privilege can indirectly determine the extent of punishment. Normally, those who can 
afford fines, restitution, bail, the costs of house arrest, and other fees are able to escape 
incarceration. In this respect, the pay-to-stay program introduces yet another method in 
which the justice system can provide differential treatment for the social elite.  
The development of pay-to-stay options as an alternative for privileged 
populations is especially concerning within the context of today’s extensive prison 
regime. The pay-to-stay program takes an already marginalized population of offenders, 
and separates them further based on socioeconomic status and eligibility requirements. It 
labels some offenders as “less guilty” and affords them a safe, less humiliating 
incarceration experience—an experience free of many “collateral effects” of 
incarceration in chronically overcrowded penal institutions, such as prison violence, 
deprivation of basic needs and lack of health care. Pay-to-stay programs offer an escape 
from devastating prison conditions and from institutionalized disregard for human rights. 
Accepting only those who can afford it, pay-to-stay programs anchor the United States’ 
oppressive carceral system in the consumerist logic of contemporary neoliberal society.  
Part 1. Hidden Agendas: A Road Map to Mass Incarceration 
Prior to the 1970s, incarceration rates in the United States remained surprisingly 
stable, rarely exceeding averages of 200,000 prisoners per year, with incarceration rates 
comparable to those observed in other Western democracies. Beginning in 1972 and 
continuing well in to the 21st century, the prison population increased relentlessly each 
year. It is nearly impossible to get an accurate count of incarcerated persons, as the 
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population fluctuates daily with new arrests and releases. However, it has been estimated 
that over two million people are incarcerated in U.S. prisons and jails at any given time 
(Clear & Frost, 2014).  
The United States currently confines people in its “1,719 state prisons, 102 federal 
prisons, 2,259 juvenile correctional facilities, 3,283 local jails, and 79 Indian Country 
jails” (Wagner & Sakala, 2014). Individuals are also detained in military prisons, civil 
commitment centers, immigration detention facilities, and prisons in other U.S. territories 
(Wagner & Sakala, 2014). In 2014, a comprehensive analysis of the United States 
incarcerated population concluded that 2.3 million people were imprisoned in state 
prisons, federal prisons, and local jails. That is slightly more than the total number of 
active and reserve U.S. military personnel—about 2.26 million as of 2010 (Hurt, Ryan, & 
Straley, 2011). It is also slightly more than the number of people employed by Wal-Mart 
worldwide—2.2 million associates as of 2014. Currently, the United States has the 
highest rate of incarceration in world history—over 700 people per 100,000 (Steiker & 
Steiker, 2014). 
What could have caused incarceration rates to grow so exponentially, that the 
United States would come to represent 5% of the world’s population and 25% of the 
world’s incarcerated population? “Tough on crime” politicians and other advocates of 
prison expansion have argued that a massive growth in crime, especially violent crime, 
caused the growth in the prison population (Mauer, 2006). Although this line of thinking 
may seem logical, it is unfounded.  
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If incarceration rates were truly a reflection of crime rates, the two would have 
mirroring trends. Beginning in the 1960s and continuing on into the 1970s, crime was 
rising in the United States (Alexander, 2010; Mauer, 2006). This increase, however, was 
not uniform across all categories, locations, or social groups. Although there is much 
controversy over the accuracy of crime data during this period, most sociologists and 
criminologists agree that violent crimes, including homicide, increased quite significantly 
during this time. This rise in violent crime, however, has been largely attributed to related 
changes in demographics, such as the males from the ‘baby boom’ population entering 
their peak crime years—ages 15 to 24 (Alexander, 2010; Mauer). This short-lived rise in 
crime can be described merely as a data point, rather than a trend.  
According to most accounts, crime rates peaked in the United States in 1981 
(Haney Lopez, 2010; Mauer, 2006). Shortly after, crime rates stabilized and eventually 
began to decrease over the next 20 years (see Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2. Incarceration rates per 100,000 compared to crime rates per 100,000 from 1970-2002  
Source: The Sentencing Project (King, Mauer, & Young, 2005) 
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The specific categories of violent crime and street crime followed a similar trend. To 
illustrate, an average of 40 million Americans were victims of crime in the years 1973 
and 1982, followed by 35 million in 1992, and 25 million in 2000 (Wacquant, 2009, p. 
11). Although street crime did rise in the 1960s and 1970s, it eventually stabilized in the 
1980s, and continued to decline for the next two decades. Despite the limited reliability 
of crime statistics, available data suggest a steady decrease in street crime since the early 
1990s—at the same time as incarceration rates were skyrocketing. According to federal 
crime data, the homicide and non-negligent manslaughter rate remained steady from 1975 
to 1995—oscillating from 8 to 10 persons per 100,000—and then decreased to 5 persons 
per 100,000 in 2000 (Wacquant, 2009). Still, in an era of decreasing crime rates, the 1994 
Uniform Crime Report announced: “Every American now has a realistic chance of 
murder victimization in view of the random nature that crime has assumed” (as cited in 
Wacquant, 2009, p. 13). Put forth by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, this sentiment 
reaffirmed that every American should be afraid of crime. However, crime statistics 
simply do not justify this notion.  
Incarceration rates have grown fivefold since the mid-1970s. Criminologists tend 
to agree that crime rates offer little to no explanation for this rate of growth (Tonry, 2004; 
Wacquant, 2009; Mauer, 2006; Beckett, 1997). Still, to quote Hammer (2001), “we [are] 
encouraged by media, politicians, and popular culture to believe that our society builds 
prisons as a response to crime” (p. 244). The current prison regime utilizes the crime 
“problem” to rally public consensus around penal punitiveness, allowing the state to 
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reproduce racial and class inequality under the apparently neutral ideology of ‘free 
choice’ and ‘retribution’ (Wacquant, 2009).  
It is essential to understand how the incarcerated population reached such 
alarming, record-breaking highs. Mass incarceration cannot be explained as a result of 
rising crime rates. Many scholars have questioned the seemingly invisible forces that 
created such a punitive regime. In order to build a comprehensive understanding of how 
mass incarceration came to existence, a variety of historical, social, and political forces 
must be weaved into the analysis. As Elliot Currie concisely states, “short of major wars, 
mass incarceration has been the most thoroughly implemented government social 
program of our time” (as quoted by Davis, 2003, p. 11). Rather than seeing mass 
incarceration as the result of a crime problem, we must address it as a social problem 
deeply rooted within the history of the United States.  
 Shortly before the massive expansion of its penal apparatus, the United States was 
experiencing great social turmoil. Groups of women, minorities, migrant workers, and 
college students were fighting for social, civil, and political change. By the 1960s, the 
Civil Rights Movement had become the largest social movement of its time, uniting 
citizens across different racial and economic backgrounds. It also brought riots, protest, 
and defiance to the forefront of public concern. In 1964, the members of the Civil Rights 
Movement celebrated the passing of the Civil Rights Acts. Within months, Barry 
Goldwater publicly announced his opposition to the Civil Rights Acts and used his 
opposition as a platform for presidential candidacy (Clear & Frost, 2014). Goldwater 
associated the riots of the Civil Rights Movement with public fear of crime, more 
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specifically, the public fear of black crime. He warned the masses: “crime grows faster 
than population, while those who break the law are accorded more consideration than 
those who try to enforce the law […] Our wives, all women, feel unsafe on our streets” 
(Haney Lopez, 2010, p. 1032-1033). Although Goldwater wasn’t voted in as President, 
his “get tough” outlook on crime resurfaced only a few years later.  
Lyndon B. Johnson triumphed over Goldwater in the race to the White House. 
Immediately, Johnson began addressing the crime issue and developed an anticrime 
agenda. In 1967, President Johnson’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the 
Administration of Justice released its renowned report The Challenge of Crime in a Free 
Society. The Commission’s report began with a discussion of rising crime and public 
fear, stating that the United States was becoming increasingly unsafe. “Some,” the report 
claimed, “have become suspicious of those they conceive to be responsible for crime: 
adolescents or Negroes or drug addicts or college students or demonstrators; policemen 
who fail to solve crimes; judges who pass lenient sentences or write decisions restricting 
the activities of the police; parole boards that release prisoners who resume their criminal 
activities” (Commission, 1986, p. 55). Teens, minorities, drug offenders, peaceful 
protesters, and the poor were identified as dangerous and as the cause of the rising crime 
problem. The report later identified the underlying problems of crime as beyond the 
control of the criminal justice system, placing the blame on a disobedient society: “the 
unruliness of young people, widespread drug addiction, the existence of much poverty in 
a wealthy society, the pursuit of the dollar by any available means are the phenomena the 
police, the courts, and the correctional apparatus, which must deal with crimes and 
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criminals one by one, cannot confront directly” (Commission, 1986, p. 56).  The 
Commission, then, meticulously described the crime problem as a “disease” plaguing the 
United States and developed a plan of action. According to Clear and Frost (2014), this 
plan was “a road map for [the] War on Crime” (p. 41).  
In 1968, Nixon won the presidential election. His platform was profoundly aimed 
toward one issue: law and order. In a short span of time, Nixon delivered seventeen 
speeches on the “pressing” issue of law and order (Alexander, 2010), with advertisements 
linking civil disruption in the streets to street crime. He proposed a seemingly colorblind 
War on Crime, which allowed him to gain voter approval in the South while still 
addressing the national fear of crime (Clear & Frost, 2014). The War on Crime continued 
for the next 40 years, leaving behind a path of social destruction. The law and order 
rhetoric of the 1960s eventually translated to anticrime legislation that would influence 
federal and state crime control tactics for decades. By 1990, federal spending on 
corrections had increased fourfold (Haney Lopez, 2010). The direct expenditures on 
corrections increased from roughly $9 billion to $68 billion between the years of 1982 to 
2006 (Clear & Frost, 2014, p. 20). The United States’ War on Crime has lasted longer 
than any of its overseas military campaigns (Clear & Frost, 2014), resulting in mass 
incarceration and the hyperinflation of the correctional budget. In the wake of the War on 
Crime, the corrections system began departing from its rehabilitative ideologies and 
focusing solely on retribution and incapacitation. At the start of the 21st Century, critical 
criminologists started to identify this dramatic shift in penal philosophy as the “punitive 
turn” or “the new punitiveness” (see Brown et al., 2005).  
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During his presidency, Nixon also identified illegal drugs as “public enemy 
number one” (Alexander, 2010, p. 48). This would plant the seed for a War on Drugs to 
be developed a decade later by the Reagan Administration. Reagan’s presidential 
campaign centered on two key issues: the alleged abuses of the welfare system by so 
called “welfare queens” and rampant street crime (Alexander, 2010). Through his race-
neutral language, Reagan crafted a platform that rested on racial animosity and class 
subordination. During the 1970s and 1980s, criminologist Michael Tonry argues, “crime 
issues acted both as a code word for racial animosity and as an appeal to voters who were 
anxious about many changes in their lives” (as cited in Useem, 2008, p. 17). The War on 
Drugs gained momentum quickly under Reagan and was further developed by the George 
Bush and Bill Clinton Administrations (Alexander, 2010), as is further discussed in the 
following sections. By the mid-1980s, the United States had successfully waged two wars 
on its own citizens—the War on Crime and the War on Drugs—both of which would 
reproduce legal and social inequalities in the age of mass incarceration. 
Part II. The Face of Mass Incarceration 
This section explores who is affected by mass incarceration, or in other words, 
who goes to prison. Politicians, the media, and policymakers tell us that the answer is 
simple—criminals go to prison. In theory, the word “criminal” is all-inclusive; it does not 
discriminate on grounds of race, socioeconomic status, educational background, gender, 
or age. It is also consistent with dominant notions of formal equality before the law, in 
the sense that individuals who commit the same crime should expect the same processing 
and punishment from the criminal justice system. However, incarceration statistics tell a 
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different story. During what Wacquant calls “hyper incarceration” (2001) racial 
minorities, low-level offenders, and the poor were overwhelmingly and 
disproportionately swept into federal and state correctional facilities. Wacquant (2009) 
describes the typical inmate during the height of mass incarceration:  
In 1992, at the acme of America’s carceral boom, the typical inmate entering a 
state correctional facility was a man under 30 years of age (53% of admissions) of 
African-American origin (nearly 54%) who had not finished high school (for two-
thirds of them), imprisoned for a non-violent offence in over seven cases in ten. 
(p. 14) 
“In other words,” Wacquant (2009) concludes, “American jails and prisons are 
overflowing with convicts who would not have been thrown behind bars 30 years ago” 
(p. 15). The following sections explore how non-violent offenders, racial minorities, and 
the lower class were targeted by penal legislation and the race to incarcerate. 
Offense.  
It is important to first look at the crimes individuals were typically convicted of 
during the time of the carceral boom, followed by who was convicted of those offenses. 
According to those in power, mass incarceration resulted from a surge in violent crime. If 
this were true, there would have been a parallel increase in the number of individuals 
sentenced to prison for committing violent offenses. Although the data confirms that the 
majority of state prisoners are incarcerated for violent crimes. There was a drastic 
increase in the number of persons incarcerated for drug offenses and property crimes—a 
trend that can be explained for the most part by the War on Drugs.  
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 The War on Drugs was a massive deployment of government funds and police 
tactics aimed at low-level offenders involved in the drug economy. Wacquant (2009) 
succinctly explains the War on Drugs policy as a “cover for a veritable police and penal 
guerrilla on sellers of narcotics and other street operators and, by extension, for the 
punitive containment of the residents of the dispossessed black urban neighborhoods in 
which they congregate” (p. 20). The War on Drugs identified “drugs” as the common 
enemy. The policies that followed, however, targeted individual traits. The War on Drugs 
was artfully crafted, cloaked in race-neutral and class-neutral language. It appeared as a 
policy directed at a societal ill, a circumstance that helped it gain public approval quickly. 
In reality, the most draconian anti-drug measures were selectively applied to young, black 
men in poor, urban ghettos. 
  The effects of the War on Drugs can be directly observed in the rates of 
incarceration for drug-related offenses. Before the War on Drugs, the percentage of 
inmates convicted of drug offenses was relatively low: 5% in 1960 and 9% in 1980 
(Wacquant, 2009, p. 19). These rates more than doubled after the launch of the War on 
Drugs. From 1980 to 2003, the percentage of state prisoners incarcerated for drug-related 
offenses increased from 6% to 21%. During that time, the percentage of state prisoners 
incarcerated for violent offenses decreased from 59% to 51%, the proportion of property 
offenders decreased from 30% to 21%, and public order offenders increased slightly from 
4% to 7% (Useem & Piehl, 2008, p. 56-57). The data indicates a slight decline in the 
seriousness of offenses committed by the state prison population. However, a closer look 
at the total prison population shows that drug offenders are largely concentrated in 
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federal prisons as opposed to state prisons. Drug offenders made up 27% of the federal 
prison population in 1980 and 55% of the federal prison population in 2003. This is an 
increase from 4,900 federal drug offenders in 1980 to nearly 87,000 in 2003 (Useem & 
Piehl, 2008, p. 57-58).  
 Since the introduction of the War on Drugs, the U.S. penal system witnessed an 
extreme increase in convictions of low-level, non-violent, drug offenders. The public 
supported the War on Drugs as a way to combat violent crime associated with the open-
air drug markets in the nation’s most troubled inner cities. Instead, individuals convicted 
of property and drug offenses outnumbered violent convicts two to one. According to 
Wacquant (2009), this 2:1 trend of low-level convictions to violent convictions has been 
present every year since 1989 (p. 14).  
Race, class, and intersectionality.  
Demographics of the incarcerated population confirm an overrepresentation of 
minorities—namely blacks and Hispanics. Between the years of 1960 to 1995, the 
incarceration rates of African Americans virtually doubled. By 1995, blacks represented 
the majority of inmates entering incarceration—55%—and only a mere 7% of the U.S. 
adult population (Wacquant, 2009, p. 19). Over the last 20 years, the black-white gap has 
deepened further. Recent data shows that African Americans are incarcerated at 8x the 
rate of whites (Wacquant, 2009; Western, 2006), with African Americans and Hispanics 
accounting for roughly two-thirds of the state prison population (Western, 2006, p.16). 
Table 1 displays the racial composition of the incarcerated population as compared to the 
racial composition of the U.S. population. 
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Table 1. Racial/Ethnic composition of incarcerated population by percentage as compared to  
composition of the U.S. adult population. Source: Prison Policy Initiative (Sakala, 2014) 
 
The term “racial minority” lacks meaning with regard to the criminal justice 
system. The institutionalization of minority populations is significantly disproportionate 
to the U.S. adult population. The 8:1 incarceration ratio of blacks to whites surpasses 
many other social disparity indicators, such as “racial disparities in unemployment (2 to 
1), nonmarital childbearing (3 to 1), infant mortality (2 to 1), and wealth (1 to 5)” 
(Western, 2006, p. 16). The social disparities between blacks and whites show that racial 
equality suffers in both the free and unfree populations. If the incarceration rates of 
whites matched the incarceration rates of blacks, more than six million people would be 
imprisoned in the United States (Western, 2006, p. 16). The data shows that young black 
men are most severely affected by the policies of mass incarceration—in 2000, 8% of 
black men of working age were incarcerated (Western, 2006, p. 16). 
Crime statistics show that minorities do not commit more crime than whites. As 
previously discussed in Part I, discriminatory policies, procedures, and legislation have 
largely affected the disproportionate incarceration of minorities. Wacquant (2009) states 
that black offenders are more likely to receive a sentence of incarceration than whites—
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when controlling for various factors such as seriousness of offense and prior record. 
However, he claims, “such discrimination [in sentencing] clearly has not increased since 
the mid-1970s and so it cannot account for the spectacular worsening of ‘racial 
disproportionality’ in prison admissions in the recent period” (Wacquant, 2009, p. 20). 
Rather, criminologists argue that such racial disproportionality is a direct result of a 
structurally racist penal institution (Davis, 2003; Alexander, 2010; Haney Lopez, 2010). 
Minority populations experience first-hand the detrimental social, political, and 
civil effects of the structurally flawed justice system. Such populations are dually 
disadvantaged, as the intersectionality between race and class becomes clearer. Race and 
class inequalities can be traced from the bottom (i.e. the police level) to the top (i.e. 
prison populations) of the penal system. Recent data has shown that 1 in 11 adult African 
Americans is under some form of correctional control (Clear & Frost, 2014, p. 63). 
During the height of mass incarceration—the mid-1990s—approximately 1-in-3 African 
Americans lived below the U.S. official poverty line as compared to 1 in 10 Americans of 
European descent (Wacquant, 2009, p. 19). It is evident that class and racial disadvantage 
often intersect, resulting in many individuals being dually oppressed. To illustrate, in 
1999, “a black man born in the late 1960s had a 1:5 chance of having gone to prison for 
at least a year, while for men in that cohort who dropped out of high school, the risk of 
imprisonment surged to a staggering 59%” (Lopez, 2010, p. 1030). By 2000, 32.4% of 
young black men who dropped out of high school were incarcerated (Haney Lopez, 2010, 
p. 1030). 
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 The excessive incarceration of less educated, low-skilled, poor, minority 
populations is evident. Western (2006) states, “The 1997 survey of state and federal 
prisoners shows that state inmates average fewer than 11 years of schooling. A third were 
not working at the time of their incarceration, and the average wage of the remainder is 
much lower than that of other men with the same level of education” (p. 15-16). Of those 
incarcerated, roughly 60% of inmates earned less than $1,000 per month prior to their 
arrest, and roughly 30% were unemployed (Levenson & Gordon, 2007, p. 67). Based on 
these statistics, it is not difficult to see how the pay-to-stay option is outside the purview 
of nearly 90% of the incarcerated population. In other words, there is no equal access to 
this public service. Pay-to-stay programs help further divide the incarcerated population 
along lines of racial and class privilege. 
Part III. California’s Prison Crisis: Prison Realignment and the Fiscal Emergency 
Part III explores California’s justice system and relevant developments—
specifically prison realignment, the correctional budget, and economic crisis—that have 
legitimized the pay-to-stay jail program.  
A large portion of the U.S. incarcerated population resides in California’s 33 
prisons, 40 camps, and 12 community correctional facilities (Bailey & Hayes, 2006). As 
one can imagine, it is extremely expensive for California’s vast correctional system to 
operate (see Figure 4). Governor Brown recently proposed to increase the 2014-15 
correctional budget to nearly $10 billion, an increase of 13% over the previous year. It 
was projected that the state would spend $62,396 annually per inmate (California Budget 
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Brief, 2014). Figure 3 displays how California’s correctional budget has continued to 
grow since the late 1970s. 
 
Figure 3. California’s annual expenditures on corrections compared to the percentage  
of total state expenditures. Source: Public Policy Institute of California (2015) 
 
According to the California Budget Project’s 2014-15 budget brief, the budget for 
the correctional system is continuing to increase despite the implementation of 
California’s Public Safety Realignment (AB 109). Introduced in 2011, the goal of prison 
realignment was to decrease prison overcrowding by shifting the management of low-
level (i.e., non-violent, non-serious, and non-sex) offenders away from the state to the 
county. In its 2011 decision of the Brown v Plata case, the U.S. Supreme Court 
demanded that California reduce its inmate population to 137.5% of “design capacity”, 
which would require the release of 33,000 inmates. Within the first full year of 
realignment, the California institutional population had decreased from 144,500 to 
119,000. The decline has since stabilized, leaving state corrections facilities at roughly 
148% capacity (PPIC, 2014). Initially, realignment also caused a decrease in the state 
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correctional budget from $9.7 billion to $8.8 billion. The decrease was, unfortunately, 
short-lived. With the California now facing a $10 billion correctional budget, pay-to-stay 
programs seem to be gaining increasing support among local policymakers as a way of 
combatting the cost of incarceration. California’s prison realignment is discussed in more 
detail later on in this chapter, but first there must be an understanding of incarceration 
trends in California. 
California closely followed national trends throughout the era of hyper-
incarceration and has been identified as having one of the largest prison and jail 
populations in the United States. Between the years 1990 and 2005, the state prison 
population multiplied at a rate three times faster than California’s general adult 
population. By 2005, the state prison population had reached 167,698 (Bailey & Hayes, 
2006, p. 1). Like nationwide penal trends, California’s incarceration spree 
disproportionately affected minorities and the poor, and has been prompted by the 
infamous Wars on Drugs and Crime to target low-level offenders. According to 
Wacquant (2009), “California quadrupled its prison population between 1980 and 1993; 
76% of that growth was due to the incarceration of nonviolent offenders. This 
disproportion was even more glaring in federal penitentiaries, where 94% of the 40,000 
new inmates admitted in the course of a year during that period entered for nonviolent 
offenses” (p. 15). Punitive penal policies such as the 1994 Three Strikes law and the 1994 
Truth in Sentencing Act (Bailey & Hayes, 2006) severely affected the size and structure 
of California’s massive prison regime—and simultaneously worsened racial and class 
disparities in the correctional system. 
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Latinos make up the largest incarcerated population in California—38% in 2005 
(Baily & Hayes, 2006, p. 1). However, incarceration rates show a rate of over 5,000 per 
100,000 for African American men in California, compared to roughly 1,000 per 100,000 
Latino men, and less than 1,000 per 100,000 white men (Bailey & Hayes, 2006, p. 5). 
African American men in California are incarcerated seven times more than whites and 
4.5 times more than Latinos (Bailey & Hayes, 2006, p. 4). According to the ACLU report 
Public Safety Realignment: California at a Crossroads, “A higher proportion of African 
Americans are incarcerated in California today than were blacks in Apartheid South 
Africa” (Hopper, Dooley-Sammuli, & Evans, 2012). The disproportionate incarceration 
of disadvantaged populations—exacerbated by the implementation of strict penal 
policies—has led to the penal crisis in California. 
California’s incarcerated population has outgrown the design capacity of the 
state’s penal institutions. In 2005, California’s penal facilities were 186% occupied, 
meaning the system was operating at nearly double its design capacity (Bailey & Hayes, 
2006, p. 9). Although a large majority of states had overcrowded penal institutions, 
California’s was by far the most shocking. California’s prisons were so chronically 
overcrowded that it was considered a human rights issue and a “humanitarian crisis” 
(Simon, 2014, p. 121). Initially filed in 2001, a lawsuit claimed prisoner health care in 
California to be “grossly inadequate” (PPIC, 2014, p. 1) due to overcrowding. The 
torturous conditions of California’s hyper-overcrowding were eventually brought before 
the Supreme Court. In 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in the Brown v. Plata case 
that California’s prison overcrowding did indeed constitute cruel and unusual 
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punishment, and gave the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 
(CDCR) two years to decrease its prison population. Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote: 
“Prisoners retain the essence of human dignity […] A prison that deprives prisoners of 
basic sustenance, including adequate medical care, is incompatible with the concept of 
human dignity and has no place in civilized society” (as quoted in Simon, 2014, p. 133). 
In response to the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling, Governor Brown signed the 
Public Safety Realignment Act (AB 109), signaling a significant change in California’s 
justice system. AB 109 called for devolution of criminal supervision to the local level, 
decentralization of corrections, and essentially limited the responsibility of the 
government for marginalized populations. Implemented on October 1, 2011, AB 109 was 
composed of the following two penal changes. First, “non-non-non” offenders—“non-
serious, non-violent, non-sex-registerable felony offenders”—with no prior convictions 
would remain under county supervision, instead of that of the state prison. Second, a new 
“post-release community supervision” program was implemented for non-non-non 
offenders, while state parole was abolished for many other offenses (Hopper, Dooley-
Sammuli, & Evans, 2012, p. 7). Both changes greatly shifted the correctional 
responsibility from the state level to the county level. The ACLU report supports this 
shift: “Realignment is based upon a fundamental acknowledgement that counties are 
better positioned to integrate public health and social services as part of rehabilitation and 
reentry in ways that the state cannot” (Hopper, Dooley-Sammuli, & Evans, 2012, p. 3). 
However, in order to measure the actual success of realignment and the increase in 
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rehabilitative efforts at the county level, there must be an evaluation of county allocations 
of AB 109 funds.  
The goal of prison realignment was “to reserve expensive state prisons for 
individuals convicted of serious offenses and to encourage counties to develop and 
implement evidence-based practices and alternatives to incarceration to limit future 
crimes and victims” (Hopper, Dooley-Sammuli, & Evans, 2012, p. 3). Therefore, 
counties should direct their AB 109 funds toward alternative and rehabilitative programs. 
Instead, the ACLU reported in 2012, that “at least 32 of California’s 58 counties have 
plans to expand jail capacity using AB 109 funds or other tax dollars, even though 
realignment provides more effective and affordable options for addressing jail 
overcrowding” (Hopper, Dooley-Sammuli, & Evans, 2012, p. 6). There are several issues 
with the implementation of AB 109 and a lack of regulation of the funds distributed to 
California’s counties. 
 According to the AB 109 legislation, each county is required to assemble a Local 
Community Corrections Partnership (LCCP). The executive committee of each LCCP 
includes prominent members of the local criminal justice system— such as the county’s 
probation chief, district attorney, sheriff, and police chief, to name a few. Each county’s 
LCCP and Board of Supervisors is then expected to draft a realignment implementation 
plan detailing how the county would disburse AB 109 funds and how they would 
supervise their “non-non-non” offenders (Hopper, Dooley-Sammuli, & Evans, 2012). 
Unfortunately, California’s procedure for distributing AB 109 funds has been 
inconsistent so far. The state’s formula for fund allocation looked closely at each 
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county’s average daily prison population (ADP) of low-level, non-violent offenders. It 
did take into consideration the county’s population and successful probation programs, 
but ADP was 60% of the formula (Hopper, Dooley-Sammuli, & Evans, 2012).  
Those counties with a higher incarceration rate of low-level, non-violent 
offenders received more realignment funding from the state—a development that 
essentially rewarded the most punitive, non-rehabilitative counties. On the other hand, 
counties that had historically lower ADP rates and were more committed to alternative 
sentencing methods were given less funding. Although AB 109 encouraged counties to 
allocate funds toward more cost-effective and evidence-based alternatives to 
incarceration, there was no formal oversight of the spending—leaving counties to spend 
realignment funds at their own liberty. This is concerning as the largest amounts of 
funding went to counties that were already relying too heavily on the penal system as a 
method for dealing with low-level, non-violent offenders. With virtually no oversight, it 
is not surprising that 24 of the 25 counties that received the most AB 109 funding—
approximately $45.1 million total—have plans for jail expansion (Hopper, Dooley-
Sammuli, & Evans, 2012, p.12, 15). Expansion costs include “7,002 new jail beds and 
722 new corrections-related staff” (Hopper, Dooley-Sammuli, & Evans, 2012, p. 15). In 
essence, California’s prison realignment has become a state-funded expansion of county 
jails. 
 As previously discussed, realignment did have an impact on state incarceration 
rates. Within the first eight months there was a 17% drop in the state prison population 
from 164,200 to 135,800, a record low since 1995 (Males, 2012, p.4). However, from 
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2011 to 2013, the county jail population increased by roughly 9,000 inmates (Lofstrom & 
Raphael, 2013, p. 3), thus absorbing almost 1/3 of the reduction in the state prison 
population. With counties planning to expand jails and open thousands of new inmate 
beds, the state prison population is slowly being displaced to the local level. When 
evaluating only prison incarceration rates, it may appear that AB 109 is successfully 
reducing the prison population. Although realignment is having a deflationary effect on 
state prisons, it is simply relocating substantial fractions of the prison population to 
county jail facilities.  
 It is important to evaluate the effect of AB 109 on the county jail population 
within the discussion of pay-to-stay, as they both exist in the same realm of penal policy. 
The two policies have several similarities: they are affecting the county level of the 
California justice system, they are characterized as solutions to the ‘overcrowding 
problem’, and they are money-saving reactions to economic crisis. The relationship 
between realignment and the pay-to-stay program is further discussed in Chapter 4, along 
with a case study of the Fremont pay-to-stay program. 
Chapter II. Rich Prison, Poor Prisoner:  
The Prison Economy and Emerging Two-Tiered Justice System 
 
The United States has a long history of exploiting incarcerated populations for 
financial gain. Pay-to-stay programs are the newest development in the economy of the 
prison, stemming from recent financial crises (namely, the great recession of 2008 and its 
aftermath), and broader changes in economic conditions. Total state corrections 
expenditures have drastically increased over the last few decades. Between 1982 and 
2010, annual state correctional spending increased from $15 billion to $48.4 billion, with 
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the most expensive year reaching $53.5 billion (U.S. Department of Justice, 2014, p. 1).  
In this respect, it is important to understand pay-to-stay as a successor in the historical 
lineage of prison industry and for-profit punishment in the United States.  
Part I of this chapter explores the history of the prison economy in the United 
States, beginning in the mid-1600s and continuing on in to the 21st Century. It presents a 
clear timeline demarcating the evolution of the prison industry from slavery, to convict 
leasing, and prison privatization. The pay-to-stay program is to be understood as one 
instance in a long historical sequence of profit-making systems within the prison. Part II 
discusses how inmates are being held financially responsible for their crimes and, 
subsequently, how the wealthy and the poor are divided into two separate and unequal 
justice systems. The pay-to-stay program is merely one of many methods used by the 
justice system to separate the rich from the poor—such as the bail system, alternative 
sentencing programs, fines, and restitution. Situating the pay-to-stay program in the 
context of the prison economy speaks to the acceptability of the program and generally 
high public tolerance for inmate exploitation. 
This chapter aims to address the following three questions: (1) Why is pay-to-stay 
accepted as a viable solution to the prison crisis? (2) How does the criminal justice 
system separate the rich and the poor? (3) What other penal procedures place the 
financial burden on the offender? The U.S. penal system has undeniably reached a 
breaking point. Prisons and jails are operating at well over capacity both spatially and 
financially. Offenders are herded into vastly overcrowded facilities where rehabilitation 
is no longer a viable goal of incarceration. State policies, such as AB 109 in California, 
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have attempted to address the overcrowding issue with little to no success. Governments 
have also tried to cut correctional spending, a development which typically results in 
fewer educational, rehabilitative, and treatment programs for inmates. With the penal 
system essentially busting at the seams and deepening federal and state debts, officials 
have been forced to address the financial effects of mass incarceration. Rather than 
questioning the fundamentally flawed system, they have crafted ways to shift the burden 
onto the offender. This neoliberal response to the prison crisis—making the offender bear 
a larger fraction of the correctional costs to save taxpayer dollars—has been widely 
accepted by the public. There is a historical trend of publicly accepted mistreatment of 
racial minorities, the underclass, and offenders. This broader trend, discussed in the 
following chapter, sheds further light on the newfound acceptance of the pay-to-stay jail 
program. 
Part 1. The Economy of Prison: Making Money from Incarcerated Populations 
Historically, there has been a structural relationship between systems of 
incarceration and the economy. Influenced by Marxism, Rusche and Kirchheimer (1939) 
theorized about this political economy of punishment prior to the carceral boom. They 
argued that punishment is to be understood as an integral element to each historically 
determined mode of production: 
Every system of production tends to discover punishments which correspond to 
its productive relationships. It is thus necessary to investigate the origin and fate 
of penal systems, the use or avoidance of specific punishments, and the intensity 
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of penal practices as they are determined by social forces, above all by economic 
and then fiscal forces. (as quoted in De Giorgi, 2012, p. 41-42) 
Rusche and Kirchheimer (1939) went on to argue two important points: (1) the penal 
apparatus has a specific economic function within society, and (2) punishment reinforces 
the class struggle between the rich and the poor, both of which are relevant arguments to 
the current dialogue of prison industry and mass incarceration.  
The economy of punishment can be seen in its simplest form through the 
industrialization of the prison. Hallett (2004) explains that the relationship between 
commerce and criminals in the United States dates back to the colonial period: 
“commerce [in the American colonies] involved the prospective use of captives’ labor to 
expand the colonial power of Great Britain at virtually no cost to the state, while also 
providing a mechanism for the exile of the ‘dangerous classes’” (p. 49). The captive 
population was exploited for political power and economic gain.  
The United States has a prominent history of for-profit imprisonment and 
production that can be traced back to the roots of slavery. Slavery in the United States 
dated from 1619 to 1865, and represented a system of violence, bondage, and complete 
domination over the African American population. The United States enslaved 
population peaked around 4 million, and represented an “unfree” labor force responsible 
for the production of tobacco, rice, cotton, and sugar in pre-industrial America 
(Wacquant, 2001). Southern manufacturers and plantation owners relied heavily on 
slavery for production, as it was cheaper than a free workforce and escape was 
punishable by death. Plantation owners were monetarily invested in their slaves, as they 
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bought, fed, clothed, and sheltered them. Nonetheless, slaves were severely mistreated, 
abused, and violated. Slavery as a system of direct economic exploitation was eventually 
abolished in 1865 with President Lincoln’s Thirteenth Amendment. 
The Thirteenth Amendment simultaneously dismantled slavery and legalized 
prison labor. It stated, “neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment 
for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United 
States” [emphasis added] (as quoted in Hallett, 2006, p. 1). After emancipation, a new 
racial order was produced. Alexander (2010) claimed, “[c]onvicts had no meaningful 
legal rights at this time and no effective redress […] they were understood, quite, 
literally, to be slaves of the state” (p. 31). Blacks were soon targeted by post-slavery 
legislation as dangerous individuals in need of penal discipline. Thus, the Black Codes 
and Jim Crow laws were implemented, with the goal of criminalizing and controlling 
once again, the African American population. “As African Americans obtained political 
power and began the long march toward greater social and economic equality, whites 
reacted with panic and outrage,” Alexander (2010) explained, “[…] [o]nce again, 
vagrancy laws and other laws defining activities such as ‘mischief’ and ‘insulting 
gestures’ as crimes were enforced vigorously against blacks” (p. 30-31). Prisons quickly 
filled with “free” African Americans and the poor where they swiftly reentered a system 
of forced labor. Thus, the convict lease system was born, fueling a racialized system of 
forced labor through the 1920s.  
Under convict leasing, prison labor was auctioned off to the highest bidder. 
Convicts were forced to work off their arbitrary sentences and fines at lumber camps, 
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railroads, plantations, and with other private contractors in the South (Alexander, 2010). 
Private contractors preferred prisoners because they were cheap and expendable. As a 
result, concern for health care and safety decreased while abuse, negligence, and human 
rights violations increased. Convict leasing protected the system of production in the 
United States and also reestablished legalized slavery and racial dominance.  
In the North, prisons were also exploiting prison labor under the Pennsylvania and 
Auburn prison systems. The Pennsylvania prison system relied strictly on penitence and 
isolation. Prisoners were kept in single occupancy cells and served the duration of their 
sentence in complete silence. Private companies contracted with these prisons to purchase 
prison labor. The contractors would provide all the materials and training (Selman & 
Leighton, 2010), and prisoners would manufacture their products in complete solitude. 
The goal was that the prison, in essence, would pay for itself. The Auburn prison system 
in New York required prisoners to conduct factory-work in complete silence during the 
day and were isolated in single occupancy cells at night. The Auburn system grew in 
popularity, as it was cheaper and more efficient to contract assembly-line work. It was 
also highly adaptable to industrialization. According to Robert Johnson, the Auburn 
system produced “a crude urban creature, a tame proletarian worker, oppressed and angry 
but hungry and compliant: a man for the times forged by a prison for the times” (as 
quoted by Selman & Leighton, 2010, p.7). 
Initially, prison labor involved prisons contracting out prisoners to private 
companies. Soon, six different systems of prison labor emerged: contract, piece-price, 
leasing, state-account, state-use, and public works (Chang & Thompkins, 2002). Each 
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system was equally exploitative, relying on the work of the “unfree” to produce capital 
for private contractors, and in some cases generating revenue for the very institutions in 
which they were incarcerated. The Auburn prison implemented the contract system, 
whereby private contractors provided the equipment, materials, and supervised 
production within the prison. In the piece-pricing system, used by the Pennsylvania 
prison, contractors issued the materials to the prisoners and paid the prison for each unit 
produced. The lease system was used mostly in the South, and involved auctioning off 
prison labor to the highest bidder who would then be responsible for the complete control 
of the prison workforce. The state-account and state-use systems mirrored the leasing 
system but was managed and paid for by the state, rather than a private investor. The 
state-account system sold its products publicly and the state-use system sold its products 
only to state institutions. Lastly, public works and ways used inmate labor in the 
construction of state infrastructure, such as bridges, railroads, and state prisons (Chang & 
Thompkins, 2002).  
At the end of the 19th Century, labor unions began challenging the convict lease 
and prison labor systems. Prisoners were cheap labor with fewer restrictions on their 
exploitability, no rights, and complete lack of freedom; for this reason, private 
contractors were leasing convicts rather than hiring through labor unions. As economic 
conditions worsened, workers saw prison laborers as a threat to their livelihood. In 
Tennessee, free miners destroyed prison camps and shipped prisoners out. This economic 
unrest eventually led to the demise of the convict lease system in the 1920s (Selman & 
Leighton, 2010). It was the economic downturn that ended the leasing system, rather than 
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concerns for basic human rights. Still, some forms of prison labor continued on well into 
the 20th Century, and then intensified again with the introduction of private prisons in the 
1980s.  
Incarceration rates remained fairly stable between the 1920s and the 1960s. 
However, during the last quarter of the 20th Century racially motivated wars on crime 
and drugs fueled a massive race to incarcerate, reconfiguring the landscape of the prison 
economy. As Selman and Leighton (2010) explain, “the loss of jobs in the United States 
due to processes of globalization added to the need for prisons to stimulate economic 
development while at the same time providing an increasing number of unemployed who 
could be swept into the system” (p. 9). Again, minority populations and the poor were 
disproportionately targeted. The punitive turn and the need for prison industry created 
such a high demand for prisons that the United States government was unable to keep up. 
At the end of the 20th Century, the U.S. prison system entered a fiscal crisis caused by 
the sharp increase in incarceration coupled with the cost of housing prisoners (Hallett, 
2004). President Reagan’s neoliberal policies, free market ideology, and push toward 
privatization opened the door for private prisons. The first decade of the 21st Century saw 
an unprecedented growth in the number of prisoners being held in private prisons. 
Private prisons existed in moderation between the years of 1850 and 1950. States 
such as California, Oklahoma, Texas, and Michigan had private prisons that utilized 
prison labor to balance the cost of the facility. These prisons were abolished in 1950, due 
to widespread abuse of prisoners (Price, 2006). However, the fiscal crisis of the 
correctional system caused a rebirth of prison privatization. In 1979, the Prison Industry 
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Enhancement Certification Program (PIECP) reestablished the right for private 
corporations to contract prison labor and market prisoner-made products across state 
lines. Government officials, including Chief Justice Warren Burger, and prison 
executives began to push for “private sector industry under the rhetoric of rehabilitation” 
(Chang & Thompkins, 2002, p. 55).  
The Reagan administration welcomed the private sector throughout the 1980s. 
This included “sanitation, health care, security, fire protection, and education” (Welch & 
Turner, 2008, p. 58). The assumption was that privatization would encourage 
competition, improve quality, and reduce cost (Welch & Turner, 2008). After the passing 
of the PIECP, government officials, political party elites, and experts in the field of 
corrections began developing a plan to privatize prisons as a way to combat 
overcrowding while supposedly saving taxpayer dollars (Camp, 2005).  
Private corporations began to have a financial interest in prisons; prisons meant 
construction contracts, a growing market for goods and services, and the increased use of 
prison labor (Davis, 2003). Today, private prisons are the fourth largest prison system in 
the United States (Hallett, 2006). Between the years of 1999 and 2010, the private prison 
inmate population grew by 80% while the overall inmate population grew “only” by 18% 
(Aviram, 2015). By 2010, roughly 128,000 prisoners were being held in private prisons 
in the United States (Aviram, 2015). The Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) and 
the GEO Group are the largest private correctional corporations in the United States. 
These corporations use their monetary influence to lobby for privatization legislation and 
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punitive policies to ensure their own success (Price, 2006). Despite the recent economic 
recession, the CCA’s net income reached $162.5 million in 2011 (Aviram, 2015).  
Despite declining crime rates and the proven ineffectiveness of prisons to reduce 
crime, legislative figures continue to pump billions of dollars in to the prison system 
every year. Human rights violations, racial oppression, and class subordination continue 
to thrive under the current economy of mass incarceration and prison industry. As long as 
private corporations and other stakeholders continue to generate millions in profits from 
prison industry, the drive to dismantle mass incarceration will be stunted. The prison 
economy cements failed prison policies in place by making money from the incarcerated, 
and reinforces the notion that “the free market works best when people aren't free” 
(Welch & Turner, 2008, p. 64). This sentiment has persisted through the institutions of 
slavery, prison labor, and convict leasing, and is now seen in the expansion of private 
prisons and the introduction of pay-to-stay jails.  
Part II. Placing the Financial Burden on the Offender 
 The pay-to-stay program is not the first system to blatantly discriminate against 
offenders based on socioeconomic status, nor is it the first to demand compensation from 
an offender. There are many avenues throughout the justice system that allow 
‘undeserving’ offenders—namely, those who can afford it—to avoid the humiliating 
experience of incarceration. This section discusses ways in which the rich can escape the 
poor man’s justice system due to their ability to post bail and pay for services such as 
ankle monitoring, community supervision, and pay-to-stay jail cells. This section also 
discusses how poor offenders are continually forced to pay incarceration and treatment 
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fees that they simply cannot afford, preventing them from escaping the revolving door of 
the justice system. 
 Offenders may be ‘innocent until proven guilty’ in the court of law, but they 
begin paying for their crimes even before a verdict is made. During arraignment, judges 
have sole discretion over preventive detention and the setting of bail. The goal of 
preventive detention is to keep defendants incapacitated before going to trial, thereby 
preventing the commission of further crimes, escape, or tampering with evidence 
(Walker, 2011). If not remanded to jail, the judge may set a price on the defendant’s 
freedom—also known as bail. If the defendant is able to pay the price, he or she can 
escape incapacitation until a verdict of innocent or guilty is determined in a court of law.   
 In the 1960s, the bail system began receiving considerable backlash for its 
unequal treatment of disadvantaged populations. The plight of the poor was suddenly at 
the forefront of the civil rights movement. During this time, nearly half of all persons in 
jail were awaiting trial (Walker, 2011, p. 147). Civil activists denounced the oppressive 
nature the bail system, and the criminal justice system as a whole, against minority and 
poor populations. The bail reform movement reached a partial success with the adoption 
of release on recognizance (ROR), which permitted offenders with ties to the 
community, family, and work to be released from supervision without bail. ROR, 
however, still discriminated against nonworking individuals and the lower class. After the 
bail reform movement, the number of persons in jail awaiting trial decreased from 52% in 
1967 to 28.2% in 2002, before increasing again to 43% in 2004 (Walker, 2011, p. 148). 
According to Walker (2011) “the reversal is a result of both a more punitive public mood 
40 
 
and probably the impact of worsening economic conditions, as many defendants cannot 
meet even minimal money bail conditions” (p. 148). Today, bail is still being used to 
incapacitate offenders and is determined using criteria such as prior record, employment 
status, community ties, and family involvement—all of which discriminate against 
marginalized populations, ensuring they remain in jail until trial. 
 California has adopted a presumptive bail system. Rather than evaluating each 
individual for risk or likeliness to reoffend, judges often assign bail according to the 
county schedule. Scheduled bail amounts can vary widely from county to county; the 
presumptive bail amount for a drug possession charge can range anywhere from $5,000 
(e.g. Fresno) to $25,000 (e.g. San Bernardino) (Hopper, Dooley-Sammuli, & Evans, 
2012, p. 20). The fluctuating presumptive bail amounts across county lines may mean the 
difference between jail time and freedom for some individuals. For instance, a low-risk, 
first-time offender may be able to afford bail in Fresno, but would be held in San 
Bernardino jail until trial. As explained by Hopper, Dooley-Sammuli, and Evans (2012), 
“defendants with little money or collateral to post for bail, but with stable employment, 
strong community ties and no history of violence or other risk-predictive factors may 
nonetheless be forced to remain for weeks or even months in jail pending trial simply 
because the local bail schedule dictates a bail amount beyond their means” (p. 21). The 
presumptive bail method completely disregards any mitigating factors, leaving financial 
status as the sole determining factor between jail time and release. When the justice 
system relies on the financial terms of bail, race and class disproportionalities are 
reproduced and amplified.  
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Pay-to-stay programs can be seen as an extension of the bail system. Those with 
financial means are able to remove themselves from the poor man’s criminal justice 
system. Whether by posting bail before trial or paying for an upgraded jail cell after trial, 
privileged social groups experience a less humiliating, less damaging extension of the 
justice system. Those who are unable to pay their way essentially convert to slaves of the 
state. 
 Those with economic means escape incarceration through the bail system or by 
being penalized with fines and restitution. Marginalized populations—such as minorities 
and the poor—often face disparate outcomes of the penal system: “Latinos and black 
defendants are more likely than white defendants to be held in jail because of inability to 
post bail” (Hopper, Dooley-Sammuli, & Evans, 2012, p. 22). Although the prisons and 
jails are often filled with inmates without the financial means to escape, a recent trend of 
levying fees against the incarcerated has emerged. 
 Going to jail or prison is expensive. According to The Institute for Southern 
Studies (2009), “[b]y 2004, about one-third of the county jails in the United States had 
policies charging inmates for their own incarceration” (para. 3). Inmates are increasingly 
invoiced for the ‘luxuries’ of prison—such as expensive telephone calls, medical 
services, and in some states “room and board” fees (Evans, 2009). Across the country, 
prison and jail facilities are charging inmates for detention. Unlike pay-to-stay, inmates 
are not paying for upgraded services, they are being billed for standard jail time. In some 
counties, inmates are charged a “cost of care per day” which can be $45 to $60 per day 
42 
 
depending on the area (Evans, 2009). This calculates to $1,350 to $1,800 per month for 
incarceration.  
 Other jails and prisons find alternative methods for charging inmates. Prisons in 
North Carolina, Florida, and Virginia charge inmates fees for breaking the rules. Under 
the infamous Sheriff Arpaio, the Maricopa County jail in Arizona charges inmates $1.25 
per day for food (Evans, 2009). In Connecticut, the state requires inmates to pay the 
following fees for the use of programs and services within the incarceration facility: 
$3.00 per course of elective education, $3.00 per course of vocational training, $10 per 
extended family visit, $3.00 per inmate initiated visit to the doctor, $3.00 per dental 
procedure, $3.00 per eyeglass and prescription, and the actual cost of drug test if results 
are positive (Reinhart, 2006). Although these fees may seem trivial, it is important to 
remember that the fees are placed on inmates and families of inmates who likely cannot 
afford them. Even if inmates are working while in prison, the average minimum wage for 
state prisoners for non-industry work is $0.93 per day; the overall average maximum 
wage paid to state prisoners is $4.73 per day (Wagner, 2013, Section III).  
 The costs of incarceration are often transposed on to the families of the 
incarcerated. Family members may put money on to their loved one’s books to pay for 
food and services, send care packages, and pay for pre-paid phone cards—all of which 
can be costly. In 2011, the Montgomery Jail in Ohio reported an annual revenue of 
$370,000 from the sales of pre-paid phone cards (“Annual Phone Revenue”, 2011). In 
some states, inmates need money for toothpaste, winter clothes, electricity, and toilet 
paper—basic needs that the penal system, a public service funded by taxes, should be 
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providing (Wagner, 2014). Instead, the costly burden is placed on inmates, and often the 
families of inmates, who simply cannot afford it. 
 Once released from incarceration, individuals are frequently charged for post-
release services. In Massachusetts, offenders must pay $50 to $65 a month to the 
probation department to cover supervision costs (Rosenburg, 2011). The court requires 
probation supervision; failing to meet with the probation officer can result in jail time, 
meaning the probation department is collecting fees on a mandatory service. Sex 
offenders incur even more out-of-pocket costs post-incarceration. Ricky May, Director of 
Treatment and Evaluation Services in Colorado claims sex offenders are required to have 
a “sex-offense-specific mental-health evaluation” for which they must pay $1,000 to 
$2,000 (Lechtenberg, 2015). Then, the sex offender must pay for treatment—the average 
person attends sessions five times per month—which costs roughly $275 per month 
(Kepros in Lechtenberg, 2015). Although some offenders may receive financial 
assistance from the Department of Probation, they are solely responsible for making sure 
the treatment bill is paid in full. Some sex offenders are mandated to wear tracking 
devices and complete polygraphs, both of which they must also pay for. Polygraphs are 
generally conducted twice a year and cost about $250 per session (May in Lechtenberg, 
2015). Although this example is specific to Colorado, the excessively punitive treatment 
of sex offenders can be found nationwide. Charging sex offenders for post-release 
treatment and monitoring is a growing phenomenon across the United States. 
 Charging inmates for goods and services in jail or prison is becoming increasingly 
popular and widespread. By invoicing inmates for prison expenses and forcing them to 
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pay for post-release supervision and treatment, the criminal justice system is working to 
keep the poor impoverished. Placing the financial burden of incarceration on an already 
disadvantaged population of offenders preserves the presence of the criminal justice 
system in the lives of minorities and the poor. 
Chapter III. Case Study of Pay-to-Stay Jail in Fremont, California 
 This chapter details the case study of Fremont’s pay-to-stay jail program. First, 
the research methods and limitations of the study are discussed. Then, Part I briefly 
describes the history of the pay-to-stay program in California. Demographic, economic, 
and geographic information relevant to Fremont and Alameda County is discussed in Part 
II. Such information is essential to understanding why Fremont implemented a pay-to-
stay program and also helps project how successful the program will be. Part III details 
the inception of the pay-to-stay program inside Fremont’s jail facility. This includes 
economic and sustainability issues that led to the proposal, adoption, and subsequent 
implementation of the pay-to-stay program. Lastly, Part IV evaluates the eligibility 
requirements and catalogs the application process for the Fremont pay-to-stay program. 
The pay-to-stay acceptance process illustrates which economic, ethnic, and social groups 
actually have access to the program.  
Method 
 Data Source. 
The goal of this study was to document the implementation, eligibility 
requirements, and application process of California’s pay-to-stay programs. To do so, a 
case study of the Fremont Detention Facility’s pay-to-stay program was conducted. The 
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Fremont location was chosen because it is the only pay-to-stay program in California’s 
Bay Area. I chose the nearest pay-to-stay program, Fremont, because I was familiar with 
the area’s history and population, and because I believed my connections to local scholars 
and professionals in the criminal justice field would strengthen the study. The Fremont 
pay-to-stay program was also of particular interest because it was implemented in 2011, 
the same year in which California’s AB 109 Public Safety Realignment was enacted.  
The study used an archival approach coupled with theoretical analysis to evaluate 
the implementation, operation, and application process of Fremont’s pay-to-stay program. 
The archive included: Fremont City Council records, the Pay-to-Stay Proposal, the 
Fremont Pay-to-Stay website, Fremont City Newsletter Publications, Fremont’s 
Sustainability Plan, application and eligibility documents, the Fremont Pay-to-Stay 
Program Policy, and local media coverage. Some information was also obtained through 
a personal correspondence with the manager of the Fremont Detention Facility.  
Procedure. 
The research process began by talking to local professionals in the field of 
corrections and criminal justice. I reached out to the California Department of 
Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), the City of Fremont, the Fremont Detention 
Facility, Fremont City Council, local media groups, and local criminal justice 
organizations. The search produced two important contacts, a deputy chief at the CDCR 
and the manager of the Fremont Detention Facility. Personal correspondence with these 
officials was beneficial to the study, as they revealed where to find essential primary 
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sources, gave important background details, and provided the official Pay-to-Stay 
Program Policy on record with the Fremont Police Department. 
The next level of research began at the Fremont pay-to-stay program website. The 
website briefly described the pay-to-stay program and provided links to all the necessary 
paperwork to apply for the program, such as the application, eligibility requirements, 
required documents, and rules and regulations. Further research was conducted through 
the Fremont City Council and the City of Fremont’s online resources. Fremont City 
Council minutes documented the Pay-to-Stay Proposal and its pathway to 
implementation. The City of Fremont archive provided the history of and original 
documentation from the Fremont Sustainability Study and subsequent Fremont 
Sustainability Study Action Plan, as well as Fremont City Newsletters that were 
published during the time the pay-to-stay program was being implemented. Lastly, local 
and national media coverage shed light on the broader history of pay-to-stay in California 
as well as any social support or backlash that followed. 
This study utilized a case study analytical approach. The concepts and theories of 
chapters I and II were applied and used to describe the Fremont Pay-to-Stay Program, the 
case study. More specifically, this was an intrinsic case study, meaning the main goal of 
the study was to understand and investigate the details of the Fremont case only. The in-
depth case study of Fremont was conducted through a content analysis of primary 
documents, a general program assessment, and a theoretical analysis of related historical 
trends. 
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Limitations 
 This study is limited most in its theoretical nature. Rather than utilizing a truly 
empirical framework, this study developed a theoretical analysis to explain the existence 
of pay-to-stay jail programs in the U.S. The theoretical analysis was constructed using 
historical data, social and penal theory, and the documentation of primary sources. 
Together, these pieces formed a theoretical framework that will hopefully be relevant and 
useful to future pay-to-stay research. Theoretical studies are equally important as 
empirical studies, and aim to explain complex social phenomena that may otherwise be 
difficult to measure.  
 Also limiting is the lack of access to data on pay-to-stay programs inside as well 
as outside California. Unfortunately, pay-to-stay inmate demographics and statistics are 
not publicly available. I attempted to access these data through personal correspondence 
with jail administrators, but was unsuccessful. Inmate data would add reliability to this 
and any future pay-to-stay study. However, Fremont pay-to-stay data would reflect dates 
between October 2011 and 2015. This short range of data may not have produced 
significant results or represented the affected population accurately. Although 
quantitative data was not available, a steady paper trail of the program’s implementation, 
policy, and procedures provided a wealth of knowledge. 
Once pay-to-stay data become publicly available, future research should focus on 
providing a comparative, empirical analysis of several pay-to-stay programs in 
California. I suggest developing a comparative study of long standing pay-to-stay 
programs in California using qualitative and quantitative data analysis. Programs such as 
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Pasadena, which has been in operation for over two decades, or Beverly Hills would have 
significant demographic and historical data to draw upon. Qualitative analysis can be 
collected through structured interviews with inmates and local correctional 
administrators, and can be combined with a quantitative analysis of inmate 
demographics. 
Part I. History of the Pay-to-Stay Jail Program 
The literature regarding pay-to-stay jail programs is extremely limited, with 
virtually no peer-reviewed journal articles. There are also no demographic data publicly 
available on pay-to-stay inmates. Considering the implications of pay-to-stay, it is 
especially concerning that such program data are not readily available. It would seem that 
a controversial policy such as pay-to-stay would generate attention among scholars and 
the public. The eerie silence surrounding pay-to-stay is as disturbing as the policy itself. 
Without access to vital data, the history of the pay-to-stay jail program is thus constructed 
from a narrow field of scholarly work, media coverage, and related California legislation. 
Pay-to-stay jail programs have been present in California for over 20 years, but 
have largely managed to stay out of sight. Some states have implemented “room and 
board” fees—as discussed in Chapter II—but few have designed separate facilities for 
wealthier inmates. California’s optional pay-to-stay jails appear to be the first of their 
kind in creating a “two-tiered jail system” (Buchanan, 2007). There is not an accurate 
count of how many pay-to-stay programs exist in the state because they are 
independently run by city police departments as a separate “service”, however, it is 
estimated that more than a dozen were in operation by 2007 (Steinhauer, 2007).  
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When the state of California introduced the AB 109 “Public Safety Realignment” 
legislation in October of 2011, county jails began to prepare for an influx of inmates to 
their already overcrowded facilities. In October 2013, AB 986 was approved, allowing 
city jails to use flash incarceration tactics to deal with post-release community 
supervision violators (Assembly Bill No. 986 § 3000.08, 3453-3454, 2013). During the 
proposal of AB 986 to the Assembly Committee on Public Safety, the committee also 
discussed pay-to-stay programs as a viable option to deal with minor offenders. “The 
Glendale Police Department jail,” they examined, “has collected more than $1.5 million 
in fees associated with inmates who opt to pay to stay at the facility” (California State 
Assembly, 2013, p. 5). Between 2011 and 2013, over 17,000 inmates paid the $85 per 
day fee to stay in the Glendale facility—which is “a major step up from crowded Los 
Angeles County facilities” (California State Assembly, 2013, p. 6). Although the 
assembly made no ruling on the pay-to-stay program, they certainly spoke of pay-to-stay 
as a money-saving innovation. 
The Pasadena pay-to-stay jail was opened in the early 1990s under the slogan 
“bad things happen to good people” (Buchanan, 2007), a slogan suggesting that certain 
populations undeservedly fall prey to the justice system while the overwhelming 
incarceration of disadvantaged populations goes unquestioned. As described by 
Buchanan (2007), “the pay-to-stay upgrade is said to serve the goals of incarceration by 
locking up first-time offenders ‘without unduly exposing otherwise law-abiding citizens 
to the criminal element’” (p. 62). In this sense, pay-to-stay is a privilege for those upper-
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class criminals believed to have made a mistake or who were simply in the wrong place 
at the wrong time.  
The pay-to-stay incarceration experience differs greatly from that of general 
population inmates.  Paying inmates reside in their own cells, and in some instances are 
“‘allowed to watch television or select movies from the video library. They can ride the 
exercise bike, sip coffee and use the bathroom in privacy. Most important, they are kept 
away from others in the facility who could be murderers and rapists’” (Buchanan, 2007, 
p. 61-62). Inmates who pay are able to preserve their self-esteem, dignity, and sense of 
integrity. But not all who can afford to pay-to-stay are eligible for the program. In some 
pay-to-stay jails, of the inmates who can afford the cost, only those who are able to pass a 
screening interview are accepted (Buchanan, 2007). This essentially gives the jail 
administrators the discretion to accept or reject any applicant for any undisclosed reason. 
Municipal Judge Gregory O’Brien suggested that “otherwise respectable citizens” who 
are eligible for pay-to-stay are easy to identify. “I think if you go down and look at the … 
inmates down at County jail,” he said, “you’ll see very few who fit [the pay-to-stay] 
profile” (Buchanan, 2007, p. 63). 
Proponents of pay-to-stay programs and jail administrators do not 
straightforwardly identify the target audience of pay-to-stay. Yet, it is evident from the 
eligibility requirements and program advertisements that the target audience is quite 
specific: upper-class, somehow less-guilty individuals from privileged social groups, who 
should be spared the destructive experience of incarceration. Pay-to-stay programs allow 
inmates to fulfill their punishment while maintaining employment, familial relationships, 
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and other positive ties to the community (Walters & Davis, 2007)—sparing these inmates 
the devastating effects of civil and social death that most U.S. inmates are subjected to. 
Pay-to-stay jail programs are yet another example how the criminal justice system—a 
constitutionally required government duty—profits from oppression and segregation. 
Part II. The City of Fremont & Alameda County 
 The 92-square mile city of Fremont is located in Alameda County and is a part of 
California’s San Francisco Bay Area (City of Fremont, California, Office of Economic 
Development, 2015)—an area known for its progressive thinking, technological 
innovations, ingenuity, diversity, and wealth. It is also known as the Silicon Valley, home 
to Google, Facebook, Apple, and many other billion-dollar corporations. According to 
the Bay Area Census, over 7 million people resided in San Francisco and its surrounding 
cities in 2010 (Bay Area Census, 2010). Currently, over 1 million people reside in 
Alameda County (Hopper, Dooley-Sammuli & Evans, 2012, Appendix A, p. 7), which 
consists of the following 14 incorporated cities: Alameda, Albany, Berkeley, Dublin, 
Emeryville, Fremont, Hayward, Livermore, Newark, Oakland, Piedmont, Pleasanton, San 
Leandro, and Union City (County of Alameda, California, 2015). 
In 2013, the U.S. Census Bureau reported that 13.8% of San Francisco County 
residents and 13.0% of Alameda County residents were living in poverty—slightly less 
than the 15% national poverty percentage (U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Department of 
Commerce, 2013). Santa Clara County neighbors Alameda County, and is known to have 
the largest “unsheltered homeless” population among big cities in the United States (Lin 
II & Holland, 2014, para. 3). In 2014, the largest homeless encampment in the United 
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States, known as The Jungle, was destroyed in Santa Clara County, less than 20 miles 
outside of Fremont. The destruction of the 68-acre encampment left nearly 300 homeless 
individuals without a safe place to sleep (Blake, 2014). Blake (2014) stated, “more than 
7,500 homeless people sleep on the streets in Santa Clara County on a given night, in one 
of the most socially polarized areas of the world” (para. 9). The Bay Area is infamous for 
having one of the world’s largest income gaps. 
In 2013, the median household income in the United States was $52,250; 
Alameda County’s median household income was $72,128, San Francisco County’s was 
$76,933, and Santa Clara’s was $91,843 (U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Department of 
Commerce, 2013). The city of Fremont’s 2015 community profile reported an average 
household income of $114,684, with Tesla and Lam Research Corporation featuring as 
two of the top ten employers (City of Fremont, California, Office of Economic 
Development, 2015, p. 1). Fremont is the fourth largest city in the Bay and ranks 15th in 
California with a total population of 217,700 (City of Fremont, California, Office of 
Economic Development, 2015, p. 1). Fremont’s racial demographics differ significantly 
both from the demographics of the state of California and from the overall U.S. 
population: 50% of residents are Asian, 33% are white, 14% are Hispanic, and 3% are 
African American (City of Fremont, California, Office of Economic Development, 2015, 
p. 1). Fremont has been ranked number one in the U.S. for technology start-up businesses 
per capita, voted second most inventive city in America, and an impressive 49% of its 
adult residents hold Bachelors, Graduate, or Professional degrees (City of Fremont, 
California, Office of Economic Development, 2015, p. 2).  
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 The crime rate in Alameda County is roughly 2,840 per 100,000, ranking as the 
fourth highest rate out of all 58 counties in California. Fremont’s 2013-2014 year-end 
update reported an annual revenue of $150.7 million—generated from property taxes, 
sales tax, business taxes, franchise fees, and hotel taxes, to name a few—of which $89.5 
million was spent on police and fire public protection departments (City of Fremont, 
California, 2014). The 2015-2016 proposed budget for Alameda County reported a total 
budget of $2.7 billion, with 23.6% (more than $638 million) being appropriated to public 
protection programs—listed as the District Attorney, probation department, Public 
Defender, Sheriff’s office, trial court funding, and the fire department (Alameda County 
Budget, 2015). Based on these data, both Alameda County and the city of Fremont 
allocate a significant amount of their budgets toward public protection each year.  
 Alameda County is one of the counties that the ACLU refers to as “The Big 25” 
(ACLU, 2012, p.12). The Big 25 refers to the 25 counties in California that received the 
most realignment funding—roughly $327 million, which amounted to 92% of total state 
allocations (Hopper, Dooley-Sammuli & Evans, 2012, p.16). In the 2013-2014 fiscal 
year, the Alameda County Sheriff’s office spent over $20 million on realignment (Levin, 
2015, para. 20). 
 Fremont is located in a unique area of the United States, surrounded by wealth 
and inequality. It is positioned near the Silicon Valley, Berkeley, and San Francisco—
places known for modernization, liberalism, and a progressive ethos. However, Fremont 
also neighbors the city of Oakland, which is known for having the highest rate of violent 
crime in California (Brock & Kiriakos, 2014) and has particular areas that are “plagued 
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by chronically high levels of poverty, unemployment, homelessness, drug addiction, and 
street crime” (De Giorgi, 2014, para. 1). Therefore, the unique demographics of Fremont, 
as well as its peculiar position in the socioeconomic landscape of the region, make its 
new pay-to-stay jail program an interesting case study in the field of punishment and the 
changing economy of the prison. 
Part III. Fremont Facility & Development of Pay-to-Stay Initiative 
The $10.6 million (Watson, 2013) Fremont Detention Facility was built in 2002 
as a Type I jail (City of Fremont, California, Fremont City Council, 2012). A Type I jail 
is described as: 
A local detention facility used for the detention of persons for not more than 96 
hours excluding holidays after booking […] [and] may also detain persons on 
court order either for their own safekeeping or sentenced to a city jail as an inmate 
worker, and may house inmate workers sentenced to the county jail provided such 
placement in the facility is made on a voluntary basis on the part of the inmate. 
(Sutter County Sheriff, 2015) 
According to the Fremont Police website, the jail has a maximum capacity of 96 inmates, 
and is the temporary staging area for persons arrested by the Fremont Police Department, 
who are awaiting arraignment or transfer to Santa Rita—Alameda County’s jail (Fremont 
Police Department, “Detention Facility”). The Fremont Detention Facility currently 
books and houses prisoners for the BART Police Department, California Highway Patrol, 
Newark Police Department, Union City Police Department, Department of Corrections’ 
parolees, East Bay Regional Park District Police Department, and U.S. Immigration and 
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Customs Enforcement (Fremont Police Department, “Detention Facility”). With 54 beds 
and five pods, it is the largest Type-1 jail in Northern California. Yet, the facility has 
never operated at full capacity, and typically houses no more than 30 inmates at any 
given time (City of Fremont, California, Fremont City Council, 2012).  
Due to the recent financial hardships experienced by many California cities, 
Fremont underwent a sustainability study in 2011 (Burton, 2013). Management Partners 
Incorporated (MPI) conducted a third-party analysis of Fremont’s financial sustainability. 
The report was delivered to the City Manager of Fremont, Fred Diaz, in July 2011. The 
sustainability study evaluated city services and explored new areas for revenue (Burton, 
2013). In the report, MPI noted that Fremont had been affected by the 2008 economic 
recession, but that it was “in better shape than most other cities thanks to good financial 
management practices” (Management Partners Incorporated, 2011, para. 2). However, 
Fremont was still incurring more costs than its revenues could cover. MPI estimated a 
deficit of $8 million for the fiscal year of 2011-2012. Therefore, MPI suggested that 
Fremont make changes to its service delivery model, reduce compensations, control 
expenditures, and increase revenue. A list of 33 money-saving and revenue-generating 
recommendations was presented to the City Manager. Recommendations included 
outsourcing landscaping maintenance, consolidating police dispatch with Newark and 
Union City, implementing a new rotating police patrol schedule, increasing taxes, 
increasing clean water fees, and developing a pay-to-stay program for the Fremont 
Detention Center (see Appendix A for complete list). The pay-to-stay recommendation 
explained the program as an “offering” for misdemeanants “to pay a fee to opt out of the 
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County jail facility (Santa Rita) and serve time in what could be considered a safer, less 
intimidating, facility” (Management Partners Incorporated, 2011, p. 90). MPI also noted 
the upcoming effects of California’s AB 109, Public Safety Realignment legislation: 
“[c]ourt orders requiring the State of California to reduce crowding in prisons will likely 
exacerbate crowding at the county level […] making an alternative like the Fremont 
Detention Center more attractive” (Management Partners Incorporated, 2011, p. 90). The 
study estimated the pay-to-stay program to generate an annual revenue between $250,000 
and $300,000 (Management Partners Incorporated, 2011, p. 90). The Fremont 
Sustainability Study Action Plan was adopted by the City Council on October 4, 2011—
three days after AB 109 was implemented (Fremont City Council, City Manager’s Office, 
2011). Fremont City Council chose to implement 15 of the proposed 33 
recommendations, including creating a pay-to-stay program run by the city police 
department (Fremont City Council, City Manager’s Office, 2011). 
Lt. Mark Devine of the Fremont Police Department proposed a resolution to 
Fremont City Council to implement a pay-to-stay jail program that would utilize the 
unused beds at the Fremont Detention Facility to produce revenue (City of Fremont, 
California, Fremont City Council, 2012). The resolution was titled “Alternative 
Confinement Program” and referred to inmates solely as “participants”. The resolution 
framed pay-to-stay inmates as less guilty, willing participants and otherwise respectable 
citizens that simply made a mistake, compared to the socially damaged, dangerous, and 
violent inmates detained at Santa Rita jail. The resolution amended the Master Fee 
Schedule for the Fremont Detention Facility, allowing the Fremont Police Department to 
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charge inmates $155 a night with a one-time $45 administrative fee. The mayor of 
Fremont, the city clerk, and the assistant city attorney signed the resolution on March 
20th, 2012 (City of Fremont, California, Fremont City Council, 2012; Fremont City 
Council, City Manager’s Office, 2011). The Alternative Confinement Program report 
identified the pay-to-stay program as a service to the “participant” and a solution to 
county jail “problems”.  
The Alternative Confinement Program report employs a narrative of the 
inexperienced minor offender who deserves a higher level of safety and security than the 
typical county jail inmate. The report names three components that are necessary for the 
success of the pay-to-stay program: the Courts, the “Participant”, and the City of 
Fremont. The interests for each component are outlined as follows: (1) The Courts expect 
that all sentences will be fully served, participants will receive no special comforts, and 
participants will be treated equally regardless of community status or fame (City of 
Fremont, California, Fremont City Council, 2012). Ironically, being approved for pay-to-
stay eligibility is in itself a special treatment and a reflection of inequality based on 
status. (2) The interests of the Participant are listed as: personal security, cost, and 
convenience. The report explains the convenience of incarceration at the Fremont facility: 
“the Fremont Detention Facility is near two major freeways and within walking distance 
of BART [and] there is adequate free parking across [the street]” (City of Fremont, 
California, Fremont City Council, 2012, “Convenience”). The inclusion of free parking 
instructions and ease of highway access downplays the fact that the pay-to-stay program 
is handling the incarceration and punishment of convicted offenders. (3) The interests of 
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the City are illustrated as follows: participant safety, management of participants, 
management of staff assets, and revenue objective. Management of participants describes 
eligibility requirements such as no felony convictions, no convictions for sex crimes, no 
drug convictions, no major health issues, no gang affiliation, and that the participant 
cannot serve more than four consecutive days at a time. The Revenue Objective section 
explains that other counties in Southern California have successfully implemented pay-
to-stay programs charging inmates anywhere from $85 to $255 per night, and that the 
Fremont program would start with a mid-range rate of $155 per night (City of Fremont, 
California, Fremont City Council, 2012).   
The report also examines the fiscal impact of the pay-to-stay program. It 
calculates that if one pod with 16 beds were to be filled each weekend, there would be 
over 1600 stays per year. A conservative estimate using a 50% participation rate was 
generated and estimated a profit of nearly $125,000 per year. The application fee would 
generate another estimated $18,000 per year (City of Fremont, California, Fremont City 
Council, 2012). At full capacity, the pay-to-stay jail could turn an estimated net profit of 
$244,000 per year (“Fremont Police”, 2013).  
To review, the city of Fremont was affected by the 2008 economic recession, 
opening the door for financial review. In 2011, a third-party auditor strategically analyzed 
the city budget and made several recommendations that would help Fremont decrease its 
deficit. The pay-to-stay recommendation was suggested as a way to generate revenue 
within the correctional system and coincided with the upcoming implementation of AB 
109, California’s prison realignment. The city of Fremont was quick to develop and pass 
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the pay-to-stay proposal and seamlessly implemented the program with little to no 
political resistance. The Fremont pay-to-stay jail program has been in effect since March 
2012. 
Part IV. Getting in: Eligibility & the Application Process 
Unlike county jail, there is no general admittance to the Fremont pay-to-stay 
facility. Lt. Tom Mikkelsen, an operator of the Fremont pay-to-stay jail, states, “the 
program does not accept all applicants […] inmates with gang affiliations or a history of 
violence or sex crimes will be sent to one of the county jails” (De Benedetti, 2013). Lt. 
Mark Devine, creator of the pay-to-stay proposal, claimed “this place is for a person who 
has committed a petty theft or a DUI […] it’s for people who need to serve one or five, or 
maybe 10 days in jail” (De Benedetti, 2013). Local jail administrators seem to be on the 
same page regarding who pay-to-stay is designed for, which is significant considering 
that the eligibility requirements are not well-defined. In my personal correspondence with 
the manager of the Fremont Detention Facility, he also explained that the pay-to-stay 
program was meant for misdemeanor offenders who are currently working, “providing 
for their families”, would like to serve time on their days off, and who want the “safety 
and peace of mind” that can be provided with the upgrade (personal communication, May 
12, 2015).  
Section 915.2 of the Fremont Police Department’s Policy Manual lists the 
qualifications for inmates to participate in the pay-to-stay program (see Appendix B for 
the entire pay-to-stay policy). The qualifications for pay-to-stay admittance are as 
follows:  
60 
 
(a) Participants must have submitted all documentation and required forms at least 
10 days before the “desired incarceration start date” (Fremont Police 
Department, Policy Manual, 2013, para. 2) 
(b) “Participants will be prescreened for suitability and to confirm that all of the 
established conditions of the program are met.” (Fremont Police Department, 
Policy Manual, 2013, para. 3) 
(c) The participant will be required to pay the application fee of $45 and the daily 
fee of $155 
(d) Standard booking requirements must be met 
(e) Participants are expected to arrive on time for detention and stay for their full 
commitment time 
(f) Participants must bring an approved form of identification 
(g) Participants may only bring approved items in to the Detention Facility  
(h) Participants with specific medical conditions cannot be accepted as there is no 
on-site medical staff (Fremont Police Department, Policy Manual, 2013). 
The listed qualifications are vague and allow for discretional interpretation. Condition (b) 
is a primary example of how the policy is written in such a way as to allow for police 
discretion to determine acceptance, even if the rest of the requirements have been 
satisfied. The documentation and required forms listed in condition (a) also help screen 
out unwanted applicants. 
The application forms clearly dictate who is and, more importantly, who is not 
eligible for admittance. The application process has various stages. First, the offender 
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must be referred to the pay-to-stay facility by a sentencing judge with what is called a 
Court Commitment Order (Fremont Police Department, “Pay to Stay”). It is unclear 
whether this decision is based on financial ability to pay the nightly fee or if it is left 
solely to the discretion of the judge. The offender must then fill out and submit a pay-to-
stay program application (see Appendix C), which includes general personal information 
as well as a medical information questionnaire. The medical questionnaire asks applicants 
to list any medical problems, contact information for their physician, any prescribed 
medications, and medical insurance information. 
The application is then reviewed and the applicant is either rejected or 
conditionally accepted to the program—pending the results of their prescreening. If 
accepted, the applicant must fill out the remaining documents, provide a copy of his or 
her negative Tuberculosis (TB) test, and pay the $45 application fee (Fremont Police 
Department, “Pay to Stay”). The offender must then review and sign the conditions for 
participation (see Appendix D). These conditions include payment of $155 per day (in 
cash, cashier’s check, or money order), a Court Commitment Order detailing how much 
time may be served at the facility, a State or US Federal government-issued passport or 
picture identification card, parking instructions, and a list of articles participants may 
bring with them (Fremont Police Department, “Pay to Stay”). Lastly, the offender must 
sign an agreement to follow the rules and conditions of confinement in the pay-to-stay 
facility (see Appendix E). The document contains 18 rules to abide by, mostly pertaining 
to cleanliness, good behavior, and prohibited paraphernalia. Visitation privileges and 
length of stay are also outlined (Fremont Police Department, “Pay to Stay”). Upon 
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submission and approval of all documents, the participant may check in to the pay-to-stay 
jail. The participant serves a portion, or all, of his or her sentence in the designated pay-
to-stay pod, separated from the rest of the county jail population (Fremont Police 
Department, “Pay to Stay”). 
The entire process is similar to that of a college application: recommendations are 
required, general personal information is recorded, past performance is evaluated, and 
applicants are conditionally accepted pending payment and submission of the remaining 
documents. The detailed, formal application process inherently selects applicants based 
on the sophistication, educational level, and social status of the person applying. Not only 
is the ‘application pool’ limited to those who can afford it, but also to those who receive 
Court Commitment Orders and can successfully navigate through the application process.  
In a local ABC news clip, Lt. Mark Devine explained, “It isn't a hotel necessarily. 
You aren't going to find a warm cookie on your bed. But it gives you an alternative place 
to serve your time if you need serve time for being sentenced to a misdemeanor” 
(Kiriyama, 2013, para. 7). He added, “as far as being an unequal treatment or jail only for 
the rich, I think it's important to remember that there is a cost to providing government 
services and that cost where appropriate should be born by the people utilizing the facility 
or the program” (Kiriyama, 2013, para. 14). It is evident that the pay-to-stay option is 
only available to the wealthy and social elite. The Fremont pay-to-stay program is the 
first in the Bay Area, and almost certainly not the last. 
Chapter IV. Analysis, Discussion, and Conclusion 
According to Irwin (1985), the detrimental effects of incarceration are substantial:  
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When persons are arrested and jailed, they suffer more than the obvious forms of 
discomfort and deprivation: sudden interruption of their affairs; instant and total loss 
of mobility; abrupt initiation into the jail; a subsequent restriction of activities to a 
very small area; virtual absence of all opportunities for recreation and expression; 
unavoidable and constant close contact with strangers, many of whom are threatening 
or repulsive; and a reduced health regimen that can lead to physical deterioration and 
occasionally to serious illness. (p. 45-46) 
For a price, the pay-to-stay program offers an escape from the unwanted experience of 
incarceration. Through vague eligibility requirements, screening processes, and 
application hurdles, the pay-to-stay program determines who is worthy of safety, 
humility, and justice. A proponent of mass incarceration, pay-to-stay is a race- and class-
based system of confinement. It allows the upper, and predominantly white, class to 
sidestep any exposure to lower-class inmates in county jails by offering better protection 
at a higher cost. As Buchanan (2007) simply stated, pay-to-stay is not available to 
everyone. It is not even available to everyone who can afford it. “Admission is invariably 
subject to screening interviews, for which there are no acknowledged criteria,” he claims, 
“pay-to-stay eligibility is thus in some inchoate way contingent on who the inmate is, not 
on what he (or, less often, she) has done” (Buchanan, 2007, p. 63). 
Pay-to-stay jails reproduce class and racial segregation under the guise of 
equality. Although pay-to-stay legislation may be written in race-neutral or class-neutral 
language, the bottom line is that only certain races and classes are realistically eligible for 
the pay-to-stay program. It dictates who is deserving and who is undeserving of 
64 
 
government protection and safety. Although people of many races, genders, and 
socioeconomic backgrounds may commit non-violent misdemeanors, such as driving 
under the influence (DUI), the undeserving can now be weeded out to county jails while 
the deserving are offered a safer space. Irwin explained, “when a given act is performed 
by a disreputable—a person who is deemed worthless or of low character—it is not 
considered the same as when it is performed by an ordinary citizen” (Irwin, 1985, p. 23). 
In other words, not everyone is equally guilty in the U.S. criminal justice system; some 
offenders are elevated to a higher status of innocence while others are carried to the 
prison gates. The oppressive nature of the prison system and its unequal treatment of 
offenders implies that “our society is not only maintaining its conventional class divisions 
but is also widening the gap between conventional society and a large underclass” (Irwin, 
1985, p. 104) 
Scholars have argued that the criminal justice system is an inherently oppressive 
institution from the bottom up (Davis, 2003; Alexander, 2010; Epp, Maynard-Moody, & 
Haider-Markel, 2014). In nearly 45 years, public sentiment toward crime has not wavered 
from the classic “us versus them” mentality. It does not question the flaws of the 
institution, but rather continues to blame individual choice. Pay-to-stay is justified 
through this rhetoric of personal responsibility and free choice. The United States has an 
extensive history of blaming the offender and then exploiting him or her for economic 
gain. Pay-to-stay emulates the neoliberal philosophy that economic power and social 
prestige can separate the dominant class from the experiences of the underclass. To quote 
Carl Takei of the ACLU National Prison Project (as quoted in De Benedetti, 2013), 
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“there should not be one form of punishment for those who can afford to pay and a 
different form of punishment for those who can’t […] it’s a matter of equality” (para. 17). 
Pay-to-stay paves a slippery slope for race- and class-based discrimination in the justice 
system. The government is required to protect all offenders equally, regardless of race, 
socio-economic status, religion, or sexual preference. Ability to pay should not determine 
a citizen’s level of freedom to and freedom from government protection. “Capitalism and 
correctional systems don’t mix well,” claim Levenson and Gordon (2007), “[…] 
resistance to pay-to-stay essentially boils down to a wariness of allowing the government 
to shirk one of its primary obligations” (p. 70).  
The pay-to-stay program is not the core problem; rather, it is the racially framed 
institution that supports its existence. The mere existence of pay-to-stay jails is an 
acknowledgement by the state that prisons and jails are overcrowded, abusive, and 
racialized systems. Yet, the most recent solution has been to create a two-tiered jail 
system in which incarceration depends on status. As long as pay-to-stay jails are seen as a 
solution to the problem, the penal system of oppression and segregation will continue. 
The introduction of pay-to-stay programs has shed more light on racial and class 
inequalities in the U.S. penal system. Regardless of intention, whether to balance local 
budgets or decrease overcrowding, the pay-to-stay program reproduces an oppressive 
institution whereby offenders are separated in to categories of deservedness and privilege. 
Pay-to-stay programs allow privileged populations to “pay” for their crime while 
avoiding the dehumanizing, demoralizing, and socially damaging experience of 
confinement in overcrowded county jails. In other words, pay-to-stay programs dictate 
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who is and, more importantly, who is not exempt from the consequences of mass 
incarceration and the growing prison economy. 
Concluding Thoughts & Suggestions for Future Research 
The significant lack of empirical data on pay-to-stay programs is undeniable. 
Such penal initiatives should be of growing concern to the public, as the U.S. criminal 
justice system shifts further in to the political spotlight. The U.S. penal system is nearing 
its financial breaking point, demanding attention and change from those in power. The 
prison crisis, driven by budgetary concern, is now commanding attention from 
presidential prospects and other U.S. leaders. It is important to study reform initiatives 
like pay-to-stay as penal debates are gaining momentum in the political arena. To the 
degree that cost-cutting measures and budgetary restraints have influenced current 
debates, there is a fear that the solution will be to shift even more of the costs on to 
inmates. 
The recent “smart on crime” and “right on crime” penal reform movements 
acknowledge that mass incarceration must come to an end, and push for smarter and 
cheaper incarceration alternatives. “Smart” and “right” on crime movements are able to 
address issues within the justice system without appearing lenient toward prisoners 
(Aviram, 2015). In Aviram’s Cheap on Crime (2015), she argues “the advent of the 
financial crisis has given rise to a prominent new discourse of cost, frugality, and 
prudence, which has permeated our political and public conversations about corrections 
and has become a powerful rhetoric and motivator in political campaigns and 
administrative negotiations” (p. 5). However, cost-saving measures may not always 
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translate to decarceration. As California has witnessed with the implementation of AB 
109, the legislation simply shifted the fiscal responsibility of prisoners to the county 
level. This inmate displacement may have slightly reduced state and federal prison 
populations, but it placed a burden on city and county level facilities. Counties that are 
still recovering from the 2008 economic crisis are left with the responsibility of housing 
more inmates while dealing with the associate increase in cost. Pay-to-stay programs, 
therefore, may become a viable option in the minds of jail administrators and community 
members. The program addresses prison overcrowding and the fiscal crisis without 
disrupting the race and class constructs of greater society. Pay-to-stay programs also 
align with the “smart on crime” and “right on crime” initiatives while still providing a 
punishment for criminals—however lax that punishment may be. There is a looming risk 
that inmate-financed programs such as pay-to-stay, will become acceptable solutions to 
the prison crisis.  
Mass incarceration has been rarely discussed in the political arena, however, 
penal reform has recently become a major topic in the 2016 Presidential debates. The 
corrections system has been under fire recently due to its steep costs, immense 
overcrowding, and the increasing momentum of Black Lives Matter—an activist 
movement that protests against racial profiling by police and the overrepresentation of 
African Americans in the criminal justice system. The movement, which began in 2013 
with the murder of Trayvon Martin, has helped bring justice and racial inequality in to the 
spotlight. Protests have taken place around the country, even interrupting presidential 
campaign speeches, and have placed great scrutiny on police officers and correctional 
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institutions. The U.S. justice system is closer than it has been in the past four decades to a 
pivotal moment of change. The direction of change, however, is still unknown. 
Future research should focus on the fairness and equality of money-making 
correctional programs, such as the pay-to-stay initiative, prison room and board fees, and 
the broader prison industrial complex. Due to the lack of studies surrounding pay-to-stay 
programs, any future research would add important knowledge to the field of 
criminology. An in-depth, quantitative analysis of the pay-to-stay phenomenon would 
help provide necessary data, such as inmate demographics, costs of the program, and 
public opinion polls. Qualitative or ethnographic studies would help analyze important 
information that may be missing from the research, such as the pay-to-stay inmate 
experience, opinions of jail administrators and correctional staff, and the experience of 
inmates who were ineligible for the program. Studies should, even more importantly, 
focus on prison alternatives, reform, decarceration, and abolition, as these are the only 
ways to undo the damage and begin addressing the inequalities produced by mass 
incarceration in the United States. 
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Page 1 of 2 
Reviewed by:  JAB 
3/14/12 
DRAFT 
RESOLUTION NO.  2012-XX 
A RESOLUTION OF THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF 
FREMONT UPDATING THE MASTER FEE SCHEDULE FOR 
THE FREMONT DETENTION FACILITY ALTERNATIVE 
CONFINEMENT (“PAY-TO-STAY”) PROGRAM 
WHEREAS, the City has established fees for specific services provided by the Police 
Department which are reflected in the City’s Master Fee Schedule; and  
WHEREAS, the fees established for these services are intended to cover but not exceed 
the City’s costs of providing the services; and 
WHEREAS, the Police Department has reviewed the administrative processing fee 
charged for application to the alternative confinement program, and has calculated the fee using 
the current wage-billing schedule for labor costs; and 
WHEREAS, in addition to fees for specific services, the City’s Master Fee Schedule also 
reflects current rates for proprietary services offered by the City, such as facilities rental, etc.; 
and 
WHEREAS, separate from the administrative processing fee, the Police Department 
Detention Facility staff have proposed a daily rate of $155 be charged to each person who elects 
to participate in the alternative confinement program.  
NOW, THEREFORE, based on the information set forth in the report to the City Council 
dated March 20, 2012, as well as any information submitted to the City Council during the public 
hearing, or considered by the City Council during its deliberations on this matter, 
THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF FREMONT HEREBY RESOLVES AS 
FOLLOWS: 
SECTION 1. The Master Fee Schedule (Resolution No. No. 8672, as amended) is hereby further 
amended by revising Article VII, Section A, to add a new Subsection 18 to read as follows: 
 
001.  18. Alternative Confinement (“Pay-to-Stay”) Program 
2162.3335   a. Application Processing Fee  $ 45.00 
2162.3336   b. Daily rental charge   $155.00 
 
SECTION 2. This resolution shall be effective ___________, 2012 
* * * 
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